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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have jurisdiction in this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as amended).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Is Utah Administrative Code R156-l-502(l) invalid because it conflicts with the

statutory framework of Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2)? (R. at 80-81)
2.

Is Utah Administrative Code Rl56-1-502(1) invalid as exceeding the scope of the

Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing's authority to adopt rules? (R. at 81)
3-

Is Utah Administrative Code R156-l-502(l) unconstitutionally vague and overly

broad? (R.at81)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The questions presented contain issues of constitutionality and law which are
reviewed for correctness by the Court, giving no deference to the agency's decision. See
Ouestar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 817 P.2d316.317-18 (Utah 1991Ustating
that Constitutional questions are questions of law reviewed under a correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision); Taylor v. Department of Commerce.
952 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Utah Ct App. 1997) (stating, "As a general rule, we review an
agency's legal conclusions for correctness").
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE
The pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations whose interpretation
is of central importance are set forth in their entirety in Appendix A. These include: Utah
AdministrativeCodeR156-l-502; Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-203; Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501;
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. I, § 7; Utah Const, art. V, § L
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Procedural Posture
This proceeding involves a petition, filed by the Department of Occupational and

Professional Licensing ("Division") seeking revocation or suspension of the license of
Robert A. Weitzel, M.D. to practice in the State of Utah. See Appendix B. The
Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Division's petition in an Order on Motion to
Dismiss. See Appendix C. The Division requested agency review, which was granted,
and in its Order on Review the Department of Commerce reversed the Order on Motion
to Dismiss issued by the Administrative Law Judge, See Appendix D. The case is
brought to this Court on appealfromthe Department of Commerce Order on Review,.
II

Statement of Facts

1.

In February 1997, Dr. Weitzel surrendered his California license to practice

medicine during the pendency of an administrative investigation or inquiry. (R. at 85)
2.

The underlying accusations of the administrative investigation were never proven
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before the state's licensing authority. (R. at 85)
3.

On April 29,1999, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing

(Division) filed a petition against Dr. Robert A. Weitzel, M.D. seeking revocation or
suspension of Dr. WeitzePs license to practice as a physician in the State of Utah. (R. at
401-404)
4.

The Division claims that because Dr. Weitzel surrendered his California license

while an investigation or inquiry into allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct
was pending in California, Dr. Weitzel engaged in unprofessional conduct and is
therefore subject to disciplinary action. (R. at 403-404)
5.

The Division relies on a definition of unprofessional conduct set forth in Utah

Admin. Code R156-l-502(l). (R. at 403)
6.

Dr. Weitzel filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and supporting

memorandum on August 20,1999, and oral argument was conducted on November 8,
1999. (R. at 80-100,173-222)
7.

Dr. WeitzeFs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was based on the following:
a.

The rale under which the Division seeks disciplinary action, Utah

Admin. Code R156-l-502(l), exceeds the scope of the Division's rule making authority
as delegated by the Utah Legislature. (R. at 81,97-99)
b.

Utah Admin, Code R156-l-502(l) is inconsistent with the State

Legislature's definition of unprofessional conduct found in Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501.
C:\MyFiles\Weitzel\Licensing Appeal\AppelUte Brief,wpd
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(R. at 80-81, 87-93)
c.

Utah Admin. Code Rl 56-1 -502( 1) is unconstitutionally vague and

overly broad. (R. at 81, 93-97)
8.

On November 23,1999, the case was dismissed with prejudice by J. Steven

Eklund, Administrative Law Judge, in the Order on Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 130-149)
9-

The Division requested agency review of the Order on December 23,1999. (R. at

150)
10.

Review was granted and an Order on Review was issued by Douglas C. Borba,

Executive Director, Utah Department of Commerce on May 16,2000, whereby the Order
on Motion to Dismiss was reversed and remanded to the Division for further proceedings.
(R. at 13)
11.

Neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Department of Commerce ruled on

the constitutionality of R156-1-502. (R. at 1-2,133)
12.

On June 15,2000, Dr. Weitzel filed a Petition for Review of the Utah Department

of Commerce Order on Review with this Court. See Appendix E.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Division seeks revocation or suspension of Dr. WeitzePs license to practice in
the State of Utah based on an invalid definition of unprofessional conduct set forth in
Utah Admin. Code R156-l-502(l). Contrary to the statutory framework defining
unprofessional conduct, R156-l-502(l) includes in the definition of unprofessional
C:\MyFil«\Wdtzri\Ucensi^
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conduct not only misconduct but also inaction and conduct which is, in itself, both legal
and constitutionally protected. In this respect, Rl 56-1-502(1) is inconsistent with the
statutory framework and thus invalid.
Because R156-l-502(l) deviates from the legislative intent evidence by Utah
Code Ann. § 58-1-501, it fails to give adequate notice to those familiar with the purpose
and objective of the statutory provisions and is thus unconstitutionally vague. Moreover,
R156-1-502(1) is overly broad on its face and in its application because it purports to
punish inaction and otherwise lawful activity. The rule infringes on a licensee's
fundamental right to travel as well as his constitutionally protectedfreedomof
expression. It further infringes on a licensee's due process rights by punishing the
licensee for mere allegations and accusations, even if unproven. The State has no
interest in precludingfrompractice an otherwise qualified licensee merely because the
licensee faces unproven accusations, and the rule which infringes fundamental rights is
therefore unconstitutional
In deviatingfromthe statutoryframeworkand expending the definition of
unprofessional conduct to include otherwise lawful conduct, the Division exceeded the
scope of its authority to adopt regulations. The addition does not constitute
supplementation of the statutory definition of unprofessional conduct but rather enlarges
flie definition. Because the Division is part of the executive branch and thus has no
legislative authority to enlarge or modify State statutes, R156-l-502(l) is invalid.
C^yFi!es\WdtzetVLiceiisiiigAppeaI\AppelltteBrie£wpd
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ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R156-l-502(l) IS INVALID BECAUSE
IT CONFLICTS WITH THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-501
Utah law has always recognized the authority of an administrative agency to
define and interpret the law, when such definitions and interpretations are adopted by the
agency pursuant to a statutory grant of authority. See Horton v. Utah State Retirement
BdL, 842 P.2d 928, 932 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Indeed, when an agency adopts rules
and regulations pursuant to the directives of the Legislature, such rules and regulations
have the full force and effect of law. See id Much like a legislative amendment that
clarifies ambiguous terms in a statute, an administrative rule may be used to interpret
ambiguous statutory provisions. See V-l Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, Pi v.
Of Envtl. Response and Remediation. 904 P.2d 214,219 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
However, it is a longstanding principle of administrative law that an agency's
rules must be consistent with its governing statutes. See Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit
Diy,, 846 P.2d 1304,1306 (Utah 1993); Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt. 912 P.2d 961,
965 (Utah 1996). To this end, agency regulations may not abridge, enlarge, extend or
modify the statute creating the right or imposing the duty. See Ferro v. Utah Dep't of
Comm.. Div. Of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 507,515 n.7 (Utah
Ct App. 1992). When an administrative rule is out of harmony or in conflict with the
express provisions of a statute, the rule would in effect amend that statute, and is
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therefore invalid. See Eaton Kenwav v. Auditing Division, 906 P.2d 882, 885-86 (Utah
1995); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Pi v. of State Lands & Forestry. 886 P.2d 514, 532
(Utah 1994) (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting).
In this case, Dr. Weitzel does not challenge the Division's ability to enact rules
further defining the term "unprofessional conduct" See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-203(5)
(1998); Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2). However, the substance of the definition of
"unprofessional conduct" at issue in this case is inconsistent and out of harmony with the
statutory framework and is therefore invalid. Since Utah Admin. Code Rl56-1-502(1) is
inconsistent with its governing statute, the rule cannot provide the basis for disciplinary
action sought by the Division in this matter.
The Division relies on two definitions of "unprofessional conduct," one of which
is defined statutorily by the Legislature and the other which was adopted by the Division
itself. The statutory definition defines unprofessional conduct as:
engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action,
including reprimand, censure, diversion, probation,
suspension, or revocation, by any other licensing or
regulatory authority having jurisdiction over the licensee or
applicant in the same occupation or profession if the conduct
would, in this state, constitute grounds for denial of licensure
or disciplinary proceedings under Section 58-1-401;
Utah Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(d)(1998). Under the plain language of this definition as
well as the other ten definitions of unprofessional conduct contained in Utah Code Ann. §
58-1-501(2), determination of unprofessional conduct requires some affirmative act on
behalf of a professional licensee. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2) (designating eleven
C:\MyFiles\Weitzei\Licensing Appea!\Appellate Brief, wpd
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distinct categories of affirmative conduct as unprofessional conduct). The Division's
definition, on the other hand, defines unprofessional conduct as
surrendering licensure to any other licensing or regulatory
authority having jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in
the same occupation or profession while an investigation or
inquiry into allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct
is in progress or after a charging document has been filed
against the applicant or licensee alleging unprofessional or
unlawful conduct;...
Utah Admin. Code R156-l-502(l) (1996).
The Division's definition in Rl56-1-502(1), particularly as applied in the present
case, would permit disciplinary action as a result of inaction, i.e. failing to defend against
unsubstantiated accusations generated in another state, and is thus wholly inconsistent
with the statutory scheme enacted by the Legislature in subdivision (2) of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-1-501 which is set forth in its entirety in Appendix A. The eleven statutory
definitions of unprofessional conduct in Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501 demonstrate that in
order to engage in unprofessional conduct, a licensed professional must engage in
wrongful conduct or conduct which reflects adversely on the licensee's ability to practice
his or her profession, which has been finally determined by a court of law, an
administrative agency, or other fact finding body. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501(2).
A careful reading of § 58-1-501(2) reveals a framework of unprofessional conduct
which involves some kind of misconduct, as well as the implication that the person has
been adjudged or found, by competent proof, of actually engaging in such misconduct.
For example, subdivision (2)(d), which appears to be relied on by tKe*St£teras the
C\MyFiles\Weitzcl\Licensing AppeaI\Appeliate Brief, wpd
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statutory counterpart of R156-1-502(1), requires that the licensee (1) engage in some
kind of conduct, and (2) that conduct subjects him or her to reprimand, censure,
diversion, probation, suspension, or revocation, by another licensing authority. See Utah
Code Ann. § 58-l-501(2)(d). By its terms, subdivision (2)(d) requires misconduct which
results in a disciplinary action by another licensing authority. This necessarily implies
that th licensee must be found, by reliable evidence, to have engaged in wrongful
conduct.
Now compare the regulatory definition of unprofessional conduct found in R1561-502(1). According to the Division, all that is required in order to be guilty of
unprofessional conduct is a finding that the licensed professional simply surrendered his
license to a licensing authority in another State after accusations of professional
incompetence or unlawful conduct had been filed. Unlike the statutory framework, the
Divisions' definition impermissibly allows a finding of unprofessional conduct by mere
innuendo, without any findings of fact being entered as to the truthfulness of the filed
accusations. This runs directly counter to the well-established principle of American
jurisprudence that penalties and liabilities are allowed to be imposed only after it is made
clear by competent proof that the law has been violated, and where a finding to that effect
has been made. See Moorehouse v. Hammond. 60 Utah 593,209 P. 883, 885 (1922).
Regardless of the licensee's reasons for surrendering his license, the Division
would hold a licensed professional strictly liable for engaging in the relatively simple and
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harmless act of surrendering his license.1 Unlike the statutory framework, the Division's
definition allows a finding of unprofessional conduct when there has been no misconduct
on the part of the licensee. Certainly the innocuous act of voluntarily surrendering a
professional license could not be considered misconduct. Rather, it appears that the
Division seeks to punish the unproven accusations originated in another state.2 Thus, it is
completely unlike the other definitions of unprofessional conduct set forth by the
Legislature. The eleven listed practices in the statutory framework all relate to some
misconduct on the part of the licensee, and presuppose a finding by an adjudicative body
or other tribunal that the licensee acted improperly, illegally, or incompetently. The
regulatory framework, on the other hand, attaches liability for unprofessional conduct to
conduct which is neither wrongful, improper, illegal nor incompetent. While the
statutory framework would punish conduct that reflects adversely on the practice of a
profession and only after a determination of guilt has been made, the regulatory

!

The reasons for surrendering a license should be relevant in making a
determination as to whether the surrender of the license constitutes "unprofessional
conduct." For instance, it should be relevant to consider whether the licensee had a
practice in the state in which surrender took place, or whether only a very small portion
of his practice occurred there. It should also be relevant to a determination of
unprofessional conduct under the regulatory definition to determine the licensee's
financial ability to folly defend accusations. Other relevant reasons for surrendering a
license might also include not wanting to pay the periodic registration fee for licensure or
incur the financial obligations involved with continuing medical education or other
financial obligations that are required of a current license holder.
2

The Division went so far as to include with its original petition the underlying
"Accusation" filed in CasemiO-95-57008 before the California medical board. (R at
413)
C:\MyFiles\Weitzel\Ucensing AppealVAppellate Brief, wpd
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framework punishes completely innocuous conduct that does not negatively reflect on the
licensee's ability to practice his chosen profession.3
The Latin phrase ejusdem generis, or "of the same kind," is particularly instructive
to his case. This doctrine of statutory construction means that general terms in a rule or
statute must be given a meaning that is restricted to a sense analogous to those specific
terms which follow or precede it. See State v. Vogt 824 P.2d 455,458 (Utah Ct. App.
1991). The general term in this case is "unprofessional conduct." Under the statute,
there are eleven specific terms which follow the general term, all of which indicate the
policy of preventing licensed professionals from practicing their profession if they
engage in misconduct which reflects adversely on their ability to practice medicine. The
regulatory definition under R156-1-502(1) odes not follow suit Unlike the statutory
definitions, the regulatory definition ignores the requirement that the licensed
professional engage in misconduct, that the misconduct reflect adversely on the
professional's ability to practice his profession, and that there be a finding of misconduct,

3

By allowing the Division to make afindingof unprofessional conduct by
innuendo, and to punish a doctor for surrendering his license in another state, an act
which is neither wrongful nor reflective of the doctor's ability to render quality medical
treatment, there is no limit or restriction as to what the Division may next choose to make
unprofessional conduct under its regulations. Indeed, nothing would prevent the Division
from defining unprofessional conduct as including the voluntary declination to accept a
position on a hospital's mortality review committee after an investigation by law
enforcement into the sudden and unexpected death of a doctor's wife, or the voluntary
cancellation by a doctor of his subscription to the Journal ofthe American Medical
Association and subscribing in its place to Guns & Ammo. These examples demonstrate
the injustice served by Rl 56-1-502(1) and the ability of the Division imder Jiafciiiieto
allow a finding of unprofessional conduct by innuendo.
C:\MyFiles\Weitzel\Licensing AppealXAppdUte Brief, wpd
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not by innuendo, but rather through competent proof. As a result, Rl 56-1-502(1) is
invalid.
n.
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R156-l-502(l) IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND OVERLY BROAD
Because a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the conditions that the
Division's regulations are meant to achieve, does not have fair warning of what the
regulation requires or prohibits, Rl 56-1-502(1) is unconstitutionally vague. The rule is
also unconstitutionally broad, on its face, to the extent that it seeks to prohibit legal and
constitutionally protected rights of a licensed professional Moreover, the rule is
unconstitutional in its application to Dr. Weitzel because it violates Dr. WeitzeFs right to
engage in free expression and to defend himself against allegations consistent with due
process of law. The rule further impinges on Dr. WeitzeFs constitutionally recognized
property interest in his license to practice medicine. See Keney v. Derbyshire. 718 F.2d
352, 354 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating, "A license to practice medicine is a property right
deserving of constitutional protection, including due process"); see also Clayton v.
Bennett. 5 Utah 2d 152,155,298 P.2d 531,533 (Utah 1956) (agreeing "that the right la
engage in a profession is a property right which is entitled to protection by the law and
the courts").
A.

Utah Admin. Code R156-l-502(l) Is Unconstitutionally Vague

In Utah, questions regarding vagueness of a statute or rule are essentially
procedural due process issues. See State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183,191-92 (Utah
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1987). To satisfy the ends of due process, regulations must be sufficiently specific to
give regulated parties adequate notice of the conduct they require or prohibit. See
Freemen United Coal Mining Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review. 108 F.3d
358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1997). While a particular rule need not provide mathematical
certainty or meticulous specificity, a regulation must be sufficiently specific that a
reasonably prudent person, familiar with the conditions the regulations are meant to
address and the objectives the regulations are meant to achieve, would have fair warning
of what the regulations require. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor. 951
F.2d 292, 295 n. 11 (10th Cir. 1991).
The regulation at issue in this case fails to give fair notice to a person familiar with
the conditions the regulation is meant to address and the objectives the regulation is
meant to achieve. In the case of Utah's licensing statutes, the purpose behind such laws
is to protect the public against those persons who are not qualified by training and
experience to render successfully and efficiently the services they offer to perform for
compensation. See Smith v. American Packing & Provision Co.. 102 Utah 351,130 P.2d
951 (1942). It necessarily follows that the objectives of the Division in regulating the
practice of medicine, along with the other licensed professions, mirrors the legislative
purpose. However, R156-l-502(l) is not consistent with this purpose or policy of the
State. By defining unprofessional conduct as the surrendering of a professional license,
after a charging document is filed, and without requiring any determination on the
charges, R156-l-502(l) does not protect the public against unqualified practitioners but
C \MyFiles\WeitzeI\Ltcensing AppeatVAppellate Brief.wpd
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rather purports to prevent an otherwise qualified professional from practicing because he
is accused, even if wrongfully so, of being unqualified.
A person reasonably familiar with the State's objectives could not possibly know
that by simply surrendering his license in lieu of spending thousands of dollars to defend
against charges in a state where he neither resides nor practices would constitute
unprofessional conduct The Utah Constitution and United States Constitution require
fair notice of prohibited conduct which is not provided by a definition of unprofessional
conduct that contravenes the State's licensing objectives by purporting to prevent a
professional from practicing because of mere accusations. See Utah Const, art. 1, § 7;
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
B.

Utah Administrative Code R156-l-502(l) Is Unconstitutionally

Overbroad
The rule at issue is overly broad because it prohibits constitutionally protected
behavior as well as unprotected behavior. See Frampton, 737 P.2d at 192. As applied to
Dr. Weitzel, Rl 56-1-502(1) would force him to spend thousands of dollars and appear in
California to defend against baseless claims of unprofessional conduct and incompetency
This infringes upon Dr. Weitzel's constitutionally protected right to travel as well as his
constitutionally protected right to free expression. In effect, the rule attempts to force Dr.
Weitzel to defend against factually unsupported accusations which he has a
constitutionally protected right not to address, and to remain in California despite his
constitutionally protected right to travel.
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Any professional may choose to maintain licenses in any number of states. On its
face, Rl56-1-502(1) prevents a licensed professional from choosing to practice in the
State of Utah if any allegations, no matter how baseless or lacking in factual support and
regardless of whether the professional is in fact fit to practice, are initiated in any state
where the professional maintains a license if the professional chooses to surrender his
license rather than return to or stay in a state where he never intended to practice again
anyway. In a substantive due process context, R156-l-502(l) imposes an arbitrary and
capricious restriction on the professional's ability to practice in Utah, without regard to
legitimate state policies.
While Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501 serves the legitimate purpose of preventing
unqualified and unfit persons from practicing medicine within the state, R156-1-502(1),
as demonstrated above, goes beyond this objective and outlaws purely legal and
constitutionally protected activity. Accordingly, Rl56-1-502(1) is unconstitutional on its
face and as applied to Dr. Weitzel.
III. THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL
LICENSING EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY ADOPTING UTAH
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE R156-l-502(l) WHICH ENLARGES THE SCOPE OF
UTAH CODE ANN, § 58-1-501(2)
The powers and functions of State government are set forth in Utah's Constitution,
Article V, § 1 which divides duties among the three separate branches of government.
See Utah const, art. V, § 1. The legislative function has long included the "enactment of
laws, that is, the creation of legal rights, liabilities, and remedies." See Mulcahv v.
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Public Serv. Comm'n. 117 P.2d 298,302 (Utah 1941). The executive function, on the
other hand, of which the State agencies are a part, is to "carry into effect, to put into
operation and operate, the legislative mandates." Id. at 302. "It acts to perform the
duties, the obligations, imposed upon the public body by law, and to see that the
individuals duly render and perform the obligations and duties which the law has said
they owe to the public body or the government." Id. To this end, the executive
department through its various agencies, has the authority to enact rules and regulations
to interpret or further define conduct that is proscribed by the Legislature. In so doing,
however, the executive department may not "abridge, enlarge, extend or modify [a]
statute creating the right or imposing the duty." IML Freight. Inc. v. Ottosen. 538 P.2d
296, 297 (Utah 1975).
The Division has violated these well-established constitutional principles by
enacting Rl 56-1-502(1). The agency's definition of unprofessional conduct enlarges the
scope of unprofessional conduct as that term has already been defined by the Legislature.
By including the simple act of surrendering a license to another licencing authority in its
definition of "unprofessional conduct," the Division has impermissibly altered and
enlarged the type of conduct prohibited by statute. Because the Legislature has only
authorized the Division to define unprofessional conduct so as to supplement the
statutory definition, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-203(5) (1998), the Division has
overstepped its authority by expanding the statutory list of affirmative misconduct that
constitutes unprofessional conduct to include voluntary inactions, acts which are not, in
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and of themselves, wrongful, and by purporting to punish professionals based on mere
unproven accusations. By doing so, the Division assumed those duties and functions that
can only be performed by a completely separate branch of State government.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, Robert A. Weitzel, M.D. respectfully
requests that the Order on Review be reversed and that this action be dismissed in its
entirety.

DATED this 10 day of September, 2000.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

By: 2 ^ ^ ^
PETER STIRBA
D ARIEN ALCORN
Attorneys for Robert A. Weitzel, M.D.

C:\MyFilcs\Wcitzcl\Liccnsing Appeal\Appdlate Brief, wpd

17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this/C*-3ay
5/5&; of September, 2000,1 caused to be
served a true copy of the foregoing PETITIONER'S BRIEF and APPENDICES, by
the method indicated below, to the following:
Elizabeth A. Bowman
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A - CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES, AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE

Utah Administrative Code
Utah Administrative Code R156-1-502. Unprofessional Conduct.
"Unprofessional conduct" includes:
(1) surrendering licensure to any other licensing or regulatory authority having
jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same occupation or profession while an
investigation or inquiry into allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct is in
progress or after a charging document has beenfiledagainst the applicant or licensee
alleging unprofessional or unlawful conduct;
(2) practicing a regulated occupation or profession in, through, or with a limited
liability company which has omitted the words "limited company," "limited liability
company," or the abbreviation "L.C." or "L.L.C." in the commercial use of the name of
the limited liability company;
(3) practicing a regulated occupation or profession in, through, or with a limited
partnership which has omitted the words "limited partnership," "limited," or the
abbreviation "L.P." or "Ltd." in the commercial use of the name of the limited
partnership; or
(4) practicing a regulated occupation or profession in, through, or with a
professional corporation which has omitted the words "professional corporation" or the
abbreviation "P.C." in the commercial use of the name of the professional corporation.
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Utah Code Annotated
Utah Code Ann. §58-1-203. Duties, functions, and responsibilities of division in
collaboration with board
The following duties, functions, and responsibilities of the division shall be
performed by the division with the collaboration and assistance of the appropriate board:
(1) defining which schools, colleges, universities, departments of universities, or
other institutions of learning are reputable and in good standing with the division;
(2) prescribing license qualifications;
(3) prescribing rules governing applications for licenses;
(4) providing for a fair and impartial method of examination of applicants;
(5) defining unprofessional conduct, by rule, to supplement the definitions under
this chapter or other licensing chapters;
(6) establishing advisory peer committees to the board and prescribing their scope
of authority; and
(7) establishing conditions for reinstatement and renewal of licenses.
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-501. Unlawful and unprofessional conduct
(1) "Unlawful conduct" means conduct, by any person, that is defined as unlawful
under this title and includes:
(a) practicing or engaging in, representing oneself to be practicing or engaging in,
or attempting to practice or engage in any occupation or profession requiring licensure
under this title if the person is:
(i) not licensed to do so or not exempted from licensure under this title; or
(ii) restricted from doing so by a suspended, revoked, restricted, temporary,
probationary, or inactive license;
(b) impersonating another licensee or practicing an occupation or profession under
a false or assumed name, except as permitted by law;
(c) knowingly employing any other person to practice or engage in or attempt to
practice or engage in any occupation or profession licensed under this title if the
employee is not licensed to do so under this title;
(d) knowingly permitting the person's authority to practice or engage in any
occupation or profession licensed under this title to be used by another, except as
permitted by law; or
(e) obtaining a passing score on a licensure examination, applying for or obtaining
a license, or otherwise dealing with the division or a licensing board through the use of
fraud, forgery, or intentional deception, misrepresentation, misstatement, or omission.
(2) "Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, by a licensee or applicant, that is
defined as unprofessional conduct under this title or under any rule adopted under this
title and includes:
(a) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate, any statute, rule, or
order regulating an occupation or profession under this title;
(b) violating, or aiding or abetting any other person to violate, any generally
accepted professional or ethical standard applicable to an occupation or profession
regulated under this title;
(c) engaging in conduct that results in conviction of, or a plea of nolo contendere
C:\MyFilcs\Weitzel\Licensing Appeal\Appellatc Brief, wpd
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to, a crime of moral turpitude or any other crime that, when considered with the functions
and duties of the occupation or profession for which the license was issued or is to be
issued, bears a reasonable relationship to the licensee's or applicant's ability to safely or
competently practice the occupation or profession;
(d) engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action, including reprimand,
censure, diversion, probation, suspension, or revocation, by any other licensing or
regulatory authority having jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same
occupation or profession if the conduct would, in this state, constitute grounds for denial
of licensure or disciplinary proceedings under Section 58-1-401;
(e) engaging in conduct, including the use of intoxicants, drugs, narcotics, or
similar chemicals, to the extent that the conduct does, or might reasonably be considered
to, impair the ability of the licensee or applicant to safely engage in the occupation or
profession;
(f) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated under
this title despite being physically or mentally unfit to do so;
(g) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated
under this title through gross incompetence, gross negligence, or a pattern of
incompetency or negligence;
(h) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession requiring
licensure under this title by any form of action or communication which is false,
misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent;
(i) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated under
this title beyond the scope of the licensee's competency, abilities, or education;
(j) practicing or attempting to practice an occupation or profession regulated under
this title beyond the scope of the licensee's license; or
(k) verbally, physically, mentally, or sexually abusing or exploiting any person
through conduct connected with the licensee's practice under this title or otherwise
facilitated by the licensee's license.
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Constitutional Provisions
United States Constitution Amendment XIV, Section I
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Constitution Article V, Section 1
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three
distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein
expressly directed or permitted.
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APPENDIX B - PETITION
DOPL CASE NO. 99-71

DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South - P.O. Box 140872
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872
Telephone: (801) 366-0310

iWjgiiiWffr
APR 2 9 1S99

Dl V:? .'ON OF OCCUPATIONAL
& PnG.-ESSlOriAL LICENSING

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL
LICENSING OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
ROBERT A. WEITZEL, M.D. TO
PRACTICE MEDICINE IN THE STATE
OF UTAH AND TO PRESCRIBE AND
ADMINISTER CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCES

PETITION

DOPL CASE No. 99 -71

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
These claims were investigated by the DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL &
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING ("Division") upon complaint that ROBERTA. WEITZEL,
M.D. ("Respondent"), has engaged in acts and practices which constitute violations of
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act,

UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 58-1-

101 to 58-1-504 (1998).
PARTIES
1.

The Division is a Division of the Department of Commerce of the State of

Utah and is established by virtue of
2.

UTAH CODE ANN.

SI

§ 13-1-2 (1992).

Respondent is licensed by the Division under the Medical Practice Act to

practice medicine. He was so licensed at all times material to the allegations contained
herein.

A* (

STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS
3.

Respondent is currently licensed and at all times relevant to this

proceeding has been licensed to practice as a physician/surgeon in the State of Utah
and was formerly also licensed to so practice in the State of California.
4.

On or about March 27,1997, the Division of Medical Quality of the

Medical Board of California adopted a Stipulation for Surrender of License signed
earlier by Respondent, and accepted Respondent's surrender of his Physician's and
Surgeon's certificate. That surrender occurred after a charging document was filed
against Respondent by the Board stemming from allegations that Respondent had
engaged in professional incompetency, gross negligence, unprofessional conduct and
sexual misconduct and is incorporated herein by reference. See: attached Stipulation
for Surrender of License. Exhibit A.
LICENSE DENIAL AND DISCIPLINE
5

The Division may refuse to issue a license to an applicant and may refuse

to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on probation, assess an administrative
penalty, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license of any
licensee in any of the following cases:
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined
by statute or rule under this title.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§58-1-401 (1998)1

1

This statute is unchanged from its 1993 version except for a statute of
limitations provision found in subsection (5), which is not at issue in this case.
2

6.

"Unprofessional conduct" includes but is not limited to:
(a)

Statutory definition:
engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action, including
reprimand, censure, diversion, probation, suspension or revocation,
by any other licensing or regulatory authority having jurisdiction
over the licensee or applicant in the same occupation or profession
if the conduct would, in this state, constitute grounds for denial of
licensure or disciplinary proceedings under Section 58-1-401;...
UTAH CODE ANN.

(b)

§58-1-501 (2)(d)(1998)2

Rule definition:
surrendering licensure to any other licensing or regulatory authority
having jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same
occupation or profession while an investigation or inquiry into
allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct is in progress or
after a charging document has been filed against the applicant or
licensee alleging unprofessional or unlawful conduct;...
UTAH ADMIN.

R. 156-1-502 (1) (1996)
COUNT 1

LICENSE SURRENDER IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION
7.

Paragraphs 1 through 6 are incorporated by reference as if fully stated

herein.
8.

Because Respondent surrendered his Physicians and Surgeon's

Certificate to practice medicine in the State of California after a charging document was
filed against Respondent by the Medical Board of California stemming from allegations
that Respondent had engaged in professional incompetency, gross negligence,

This statute is unchanged from its 1993 version.
3

/li\1

unprofessional conduct and sexual misconduct, Respondent has engaged in
unprofessional conduct, constituting grounds for sanctioning Respondent's license as
provided under

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 58-1 -401 -(2)(a)(1996).

WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief:
1.

that Respondent be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in the acts

alleged herein;
2.

that by engaging in the above acts, Respondent be adjudged and decreed

to have violated the enumerated provisions of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing Act;
3.

that an Order be issued revoking or suspending the license of

Respondent to practice as a physician in accordance with the provisions of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-1-401(2)(a)(1998).

DATED this c^9^A

day of

/sL^a^t^L-.

a

^O yC

, 1999.

^

;£kiadfcJZ_

Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing
Department of Commerce

APPROVED. FOR FILING

distant ^ttorne)(/6e*neral

4

STATE OF UTAH )
:ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
On the o ^ V ^ f d a y of

/^L^L\^t^Jt^

1999, personally appeared before

me Irene Gayheart, and after being duly sworn, deposes and says; that she has read
the foregoing Petition and knows the contents thereof; and the same is true to the best
of her knowledge except as to matters stated on information and belief, and that as to
those matters she believes it to be true.

• ^ J f l ^ * ^ ^ -*Jr4~&^tC^
Investigator
Division of Occupational & Professional
Licensing
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this

\)\

day of.

m_

1999.

"TKyfARY PUBLIC
CAROL W Y INQ^SBY

m.. n muitim
NOTARY PUBLIC

cJfelONEXMRESl
CTATE OF UTAH,

My Commission Expires:

vn-MKii
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EXHIBIT A
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BEFORE THE
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA
DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Accusation
Against:

)
No.

ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D.
Certificate No,. A-48888

10-95-57008

)
)

Respondent.

)

PECISION
The a t t a c h e d S t i p u l a t i o n f o r S u r r e n d e r o f

License

i n c a s e number 1 0 - 9 5 - 5 7 0 0 8 i s hereby a d o p t e d by t h e D i v i s i o n
of M e d i c a l Q u a l i t y o f t h e Medical Board o f C a l i f o r n i a a s

its

d e c i s i o n i n t h e above e n t i t l e d matter*

T h i s D e c i s i o n s h a l l become e f f e c t i v e on
IT I S SO ORDERED
*• •

March 27 y 1997

%

Or CALIFORNIA

• . - •. :/ mar

DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALTY
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA

•'--: en fi!o in this

o.'.vi...

By

UL
'UGhEO

March 27, 1997

(/

DATE

A

L

ANABEL ANDERSON IMBERT, M . D .
President

UKIb'INAL
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l
of t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a
THOMAS S. LAZAR,
Deputy A t t o r n e y General
S t a t e B a r No.- 120621
D e p a r t m e n t of J u s t i c e
P . O . Box 85266
San D i e g o , CA 92186-5266
T e l e p h o n e : (619) 645-2117
Attorneys for

Complainant
BEFORE THE
DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY
MEDICAL BOARD OF CALD70RNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

I n t h e M a t t e r of t h e A c c u s a t i o n
Against:
ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D.
4052 West P i o n e e r P a r k Way
S u i t e 201
West V a l l e y C e n t e r , U t a h 84120

}
)
)
)
}
)
)

P h y s i c i a n ' s and S u r g e o n ' s
C e r t i f i c a t e No. A 4 8 8 8 8 ,

)
)

Respondent.

Case No.

10-95-57008

OAH No. L-9611250
STIPULATION FOR
SURRENDER OF LICENSUR

)

IT IS HEREBY STTPULATED AND AGREED b y a n d b e t w e e n

th

p a r t i e s to the above-entitled proceedings t h a t the following
matters are t r u e :
1.

Complainant Ron Joseph i s the Executive Directo

of the Medical Board of C a l i f o r n i a , Department of Consumer
Affairs ("Board") and i s r e p r e s e n t e d by Daniel E. Lungren,
Attorney General of the S t a t e of California, by Thomas S. Laze
Deputy Attorney General.
//

1.

AM.

1

2.

Robert Weitzel, M.D. ("respondent"), is

2

represented by attorney Bruce E. Sulzner, Esq., SULZNER &

3

ASSOCIATES, whose address is 402 West Broadway, Suite 810, San

4

Diego, CA 92101.

5

Stipulation with his attorney, and respondent has carefully rea

6

and fully understands this Stipulation.

7
8

3.

Respondent has discussed the effects of this

Respondent has received and read the Accusation

which is presently on file and pending in Case No. 10-95-57008,

9 j! before the Division of Medical Quality of the Board ("Division*
10

a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A and incorporated here:

11

by reference as if fully set forth herein.

12

4.

Respondent understands the nature of the charge:

13

alleged in the Accusation and that, if proven at hearing, such

14

charges and allegations would constitute cause for imposing

15

discipline upon respondent's license issued by the Board.

16

5.

Respondent and his counsel are aware of each of

17

respondent's rights, including the right to a hearing on the

18

charges and allegations, the right to confront and cross-exami

19

witnesses who would testify against respondent, the right to

20

testify and present evidence on his own-behalf, as well as th*

21

right to the issuance of subpoenas to compel the attendance oi

22

witnesses and the production of documents, the right to contei

23

the charges and allegations, and other rights which are accor

24

respondent pursuant to the California Administrative Procedur

25

Act (Gov. Code, §§ 11500, et seq.) and other applicable laws,

26

including the right to seek reconsideration, review by the-

27

superior court, and appellate review.

2.

401

1

6.

For the purpose of resolving Accusation No. 10-95

2

57008, respondent hereby gives up his right to contest that caus

3

for discipline exists based on those charges and agrees to

4

surrender of his Physician's and Surgeon's license for the

5

Division's formal acceptance.

6

7.

Respondent understands that by signing this

7

Stipulation he is enabling the Division to issue its order

6

accepting the surrender of his license without further process.

9

He understands and agrees that Board staff and counsel for

10

complainant may communicate directly with the Division regardinc

11

this Stipulation, without notice to or participation by

12 J respondent or his counsel.

In the event that this Stipulation i

13

rejected for any reason by the Division, it will be of no force

14

or effect for either party.

15

disqualified from further action in this matter by virtue of it*

16

consideration of this Stipulation.

17

8.

The Division will not be

Upon acceptance of this Stipulation by the

18

Division, respondent understands that he will no longer be

19

permitted to practice as a physician or surgeon in California,

20

and also agrees to surrender and cause to be delivered to-the

21

Division both his license and wallet certificate before the

22

effective date of the Decision.

23

9.

Respondent fully understands and agrees that if

24

ever files an application for relicensure or reinstatement in t

25

State of California, the Division shall treat it as a petition

26

for reinstatement, and respondent must comply with all the laws

27

regulations and procedures for reinstatement of a revoked licer

4(0

1 || in effect at the time the petition is filed, and all of the
2 |] charges and allegations contained in Accusation No. 10-95-57008
3

will be deemed to be true, correct and admitted by respondent

4

when the Division determines whether to grant or deny the

5

petition.

6

10.

Respondent fully understands and agrees that he

7

will reimburse the Division the amount of $2,300.00 as the cost

8

of investigation and prosecution of this matter.

Respondent

9 I understands and agrees that a certified check in the amount of
10

$2,300.00, made payable to the Medical Board of California, mus

11

be tendered along with this Stipulation, which must be execute(

12

by both respondent and his counsel, before this Stipulation wi

13

be considered by the Division. Failure to tender the certifie

14 i check, as described above, along with the fully executed
15

Stipulation shall render this Stipulation null and void.

16

Stipulation is not adopted by the Division for any reason, sue

17

reimbursement will be returned to respondent.

1 8 II

11.

If t

All admissions and recitals contained in this

19

stipulation are made solely for the purpose of settlement in t

20

proceeding and for any other proceedings in which the Divisio:

21

other professional licensing agency is involved, and shall no

22

admissible in any other criminal or civil proceedings.

23

ACCEPTANCE

24 jl

I, Robert Weitzel, M.D., have carefully read the ah

25* stipulation and enter into it freely and voluntarily with the
26

advice of counsel, and with full knowledge of its force and

27

effect, do hereby surrender my Physician's and Surgeon's

411

1

Certificate No. A 48888 to the Division for its formal

2

acceptance.

3

I recognize that upon its formal acceptance by the Division, I

4

will lose all rights and privileges to practice as a physician

5

and surgeon in the State of California and I also will cause to

6

be delivered' to the Division both my license and wallet

7

certificate before the effective date of the Decision.

8

By signing this Stipulation to surrender my license

DATED: AJ / *•( /<? 1

.

9
10

Rotfeft Wei/£zel, M.D.
Respondent

11
12
13

I concur in the stipulation

14
15

DATED:

16
17
18
19
20

DATED : (W/yw-M^

17. M 1

21
22

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, Attorney General
of the State of California

23
24

I I % M S I fc^—^

25

Thomas S. Lazar/\
Deputy Attorney^eineral
Attorneys for Complainant

26
27

5.

M%

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, Attorney General A'.*r?iCA? r>C-A~r»
y^ n .
w *.=.-!/C A
r
>f the
H I P State
Chstp of
of California
.
- * '••<•-'
of
California
, ~~"~~~'7"~.
'
'
.
'** ^ U F O R N J ,
,er
c, s
*
'
"
'
[>V
rho2 M. GAYLE ASKREN, [State Bar No. 52189 t " v V "'
Deputy Attorney General
'••''* f - ' , - : * . • * \~ f.\.:.r
3 Department of Justice
CK\.-.i O C — . w l . ;-. ... o? ihc110 West A Street, Suite 1100
•el,..
4 Post Office B o x 85266
Q
San Diego, California 92186-5266
5 Telephone: (619) 645-2087
c
1

4

6

DATE

Attorneys for Complainant

7

^ &

TTTte
BEFORE T H E
M E D I C A L B O A R D O F CALIFORNIA
STATE O F CALIFORNIA

8
9
10
11

In the Matter of the Accusation
Against:

NO.

10-95-57008

12
13
14
15

ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D.
4052 W . Pioneer Park Way, Ste. 201
West Valley City # Utah 84120

A C C U S A T I O N

Physician's and Surgeon's
Certificate N o . A 48888

16

Respondent.

17
18
19

Complainant RON JOSEPH, as cause for disciplinary
action, alleges:

20
21

PARTIES
1.

Complainant is the Executive Director of the

22

Medical Board of California, Department of Consumer Affairs

23

( w Board H ), and makes and files this accusation solely in his

24

official capacity.

25

License Status

26

2.

27

O n or about November 13, 1990, Physician's and

Surgeon's Certificate No. A 48888 was issued b y the Board to

LVK

1

ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D. (Mrespondentw), and at all times relevant

2

herein, said Physician's and Surgeon's Certificate was in full

3

force and effect.

4

Respondent is not a supervisor of a physician assistant.

Said certificate expired May 31, 1994.

5

JPRISDICTION

6

3.

This accusation is brought before the Division of

7

Medical Quality of the Medical Board of California, Department oi

8

Consumer Affairs (hereinafter the "Division"), under the

9

authority of the following sections of the California Business

10

and Professions Code (hereinafter "Code"):

11

A.

Section 2227 of the Code provides that the

12

Board may revoke, suspend for a period not to exceed one

13

year, or place on probation and order the payment of

14

probation monitoring costs, the license of any licensee who

15

has been found guilty under the Medical Practice Act.

16

B.

Section 2234 of the Code provides that

17

unprofessional conduct includes, but is not limited to, the

18

following:

19

n

(a) Violating or attempting to violate, directly

20

or indirectly, or assisting in or abetting the

21

violation of, or conspiring to violate, any provision

22

of this chapter.

23

w

Gross negligence,

24

w

Repeated negligent acts.

25

w

(d)

Incompetence*

26

w

(e)

The commission of any act involving

27

(b)

(c)

dishonesty or corruption which is substantially related

2.

4(4-

1

to the qualifications, functions, or duties of a

2

physician and surgeon •

3
4

w

(f)

Any action or conduct which would have

warranted the denial of a certificate. "

5

C.

Section 726 of the Code provides that the

6

commission of any act of sexual abuse, misconduct, or

7

relations with a patient, client, or customer constitutes

8

luiprofessional conduct and grounds for disciplinary action

9

for any person licensed under this division, under any

10

initiative act referred to in this division and under

11

Chapter 17 (commencing with section 9000) of Division 3,

12

This section shall not apply to sexual contact between a

13

physician and surgeon and his or her spouse or person in a:

14

equivalent domestic relationship when that physician and

15

surgeon provides medical treatment, other than

16

psychotherapeutic treatment, to his or her spouse or perso

17

in an equivalent domestic relationship,

18

D.

19

hereto, that

20
21

"(a)

Section 729 of the Code provides, as relevs

Any physician and surgeon, psychotherapist,

alcohol and drug abuse counselor or any person holding

.22

himself or herself out to be a physician and surgeon,

23

psychotherapist, or alcohol and drug abuse counselor,

24

who engages in an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy,

25

oral copulation, or sexual contact with a patient or

26

client, or with a former patient or client when the

27

relationship was terminated primarily for the purpose

3.

4-1G)

1

of engaging in those acts, unless the physician and

2

surgeon, psychotherapist, or alcohol and drug abuse

3

counselor has referred the patient or client to an

4

independent and objective physician and surgeon,

5

psychotherapist, or alcohol and drug abuse counselor

6

recommended by a third-party physician and surgeon,

7 I

psychotherapist, or drug and alcohol abuse counselor

8 I

for treatment, is guilty of sexual exploitation by a

9
10

fi

physician and surgeon, psychotherapist, or drug and
alcohol abuse counselor."

11

For purposes of subdivision (a), in no instance

12

shall consent of the patient or client be a defense,

13

However, physicians and surgeons shall not be guilty of

14

sexual exploitation for touching any intimate part of a

15

patient or client unless the touching is outside the scope

16

of medical examination and treatment, or the touching is

17

done for sexual gratification,

18

"(c)

For purposes of this section:

19

"(1)

Psychotherapist' has the same meaning as

20

defined in Section 728,

21

"(2)

*Alcohol and drug abuse counselor' means an

22

individual who holds himself or herself out to be an

23

alcohol or drug abuse professional or paraprofessional.

24

"(3)

%

Sexual contact' means sexual intercourse or

25

the touching of an intimate part of a patient for the

26

purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse.

27 I \ \ \

MI*

"(4)

1

'Intimate part' and 'touching' have the same

2

meanings as defined in Section 243.4 of the Penal

3

Code."

4

C.

Section 125.3 of the Code provides, in part,

5

that the Board may request the administrative law judge to

6

direct any licentiate found to have committed a violation oi

7

violations of the licensing act, to pay the Board a sum not

8

to exceed the reasonable costs of the investigation and

9

enforcement of the case.

10

FACTS
4.

11
12

Respondent ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D. is subject to

disciplinary action on account of the following:
Patient Nancy M.

13
14

A.

On or about January 29, 1990, Nancy M., a 32-

15

year-old female, became a patient at the University of

16

California San Diego (UCSD), Department of Psychiatry, UCSD

17

Outpatient Psychiatric Services. On initial intake she

18

related symptoms of angry moods, depression, anxiety,

19

insomnia, and confusion, with decreases in appetite,

20

concentration, and short-term memory.

21

to a daughter about four months previously and was

22

experiencing marital difficulties with her husband, a

23

physician.

24

as depressed as she had been when she had made a suicide

25

attempt in 1979.

26

\ \ \

27

\ \ \

She had given—birth

She was not suicidal but was fearful of becomiE

5.
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1

B.

On or about March 5, 1990, the evaluator at

2

UCSD prescribed a treatment plan which, in part, set forth

3

DSM III diagnoses as follows:
n

4

Axis I- Adjustment disorder with depressive mood;

5

rule out major depression recurrent; rule out post-

6

partum depression.

7

"Axis II- Rule out borderline/narcissistic traits.

8 11

n

. . .«

II

9
10 I

ti

Patient Nancy M. was assigned to receive individual
psychotherapy once per week.

11

C.

On or about July 27, 1990, the patient saw

12

respondent for a medical/psychopharmacological evaluation.

13

Respondent, who was employed as a psychiatric resident by

14

UCSD Outpatient Psychiatric Services, Gifford Mental Health

15

Center, prescribed imipramine, a drug for the relief of

16

symptoms of depression, for this patient.

17

responsibility for the care of Nancy M. was transferred to

18

respondent.

19

D.

Soon thereafter,

From on or about July 27, 1990, and

20

continuing through and including June 22, 1992, respondent

21

personally provided psychiatric care and treatment to this

22

patient, and had a psychotherapist-patient relationship wit

23

her. During the course of psychotherapy, respondent also

24

prescribed Buspar, a drug for the management of anxiety

25

disorders; Desipramine, an antidepressant drug; and Xanax,

26

an anxiolytic.

27 I \ \ \
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1

E.

In or about May of 1991, respondent noted in

2

his treatment record of Nancy M. that "She brought up that

3

she heard me tell her she looked just like my ex-wife (do I

4

disappoint her?) (does she wonder where my loyalties lie--

5

toward her treatment or another kind of relationship?) .,f

6

F.

On or about September of 1991, the

7

administrator of respondent's residency program directed

8

respondent to obtain supervision with Stephen G., a

9

psychiatrist, due to respondent's self-reported confusion

10

about patients having sexual feelings for him and about how

11

he should handle such feelings in a therapeutic manner.

12

G.

During the course of therapy with respondent

13

the patient dealt with her relationship with her husband;

14

she exerted efforts to maintain such relationship.

15

treatment notes, however, respondent states "It becomes

16

clear how poorly matched the two are."

17
18

H.

In his

On or about April 21, 1992, the patient and

her husband broke up.

19

I.

On or about June 22, 1992, respondent noted

20

in a medical record document entitled "Termination Summary'

21

that Nancy M. (therein referred to as "Nancy H.") was

22

functioning well, her divorce was "complete, in essence, a:

23

she was doing well with the care of her child."

24

respondent wrote "Patient elects to terminate, as I am

25

leaving practice here, she will self-refer to a new

26

therapist [as needed]."

Thereafte

27 I \ \ \
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1 II

J.

On or about June 22, 1992, an intimate sexual

2 II

relationship began between respondent and Nancy ft. On June

3 II

23, 1992, and theretofore, respondent professed his love for

4

Nancy M,, as well as love for "her wisdom, her laughter, her

5

strength, her body, her spirit, her child, and her soul."

6

The relationship between them terminated approximately two

7

years later, but not before she had become pregnant and had

8

an abortion.

9

5. As a result of the conduct described in paragraph 4

10

above, respondent is alleged to have committed acts of sexual

11

misconduct and sexual exploitation, in violation of Code sections

12

726 and 729, as more particularly alleged hereinafter:

13
14

A.

During the course of psychotherapy with Nancy

M., respondent committed severe boundary violations, in that

15

(1) Respondent undermined the patient's

16

relationship with her treating psychotherapist and arranged

17

for the patient to be transferred to respondent's caseload

18

in order to have increased contact with her for

19

nontherapeutic reasons;

20

(2)

In the course of psychotherapy

21

respondent undermined the marriage of Nancy M. and her

22

husband by methodically preying on her vulnerabilities,

23

weaknesses, and dependency during a time of marital distres

24

and confusion;

25
26

(3) Respondent met with Nancy M. in nontherapeutic settings including the park, restaurants, and

27 I \ \ \

AtO

1

his apartment, the last of which he called his "borrowed

2

office;"
(4)

3

Respondent disclosed personal

4

information about himself which was irrelevant to the

5

treatment of Nancy M.;
(5)

6

Respondent related to Nancy M. in an

7

increasingly seductive and erotic fashion, in that he hugged

8

her, offered to massage her sore muscles, kissed her,

9

fondled her breasts, and professed his love for her; this

10

seduction began while Nancy M. was under the care of

11

respondent during his residency at UCSD, and culminated in £

12

sexual relationship

13

completion of respondent's residency;

14

(6)

(sexual intercourse) soon after the

As a result of the betrayal by

15

respondent of the psychotherapeutic relationship, Nancy M.

16

suffered severe psychological damage, including symptoms of

17

depression, anxiety, guilt, anger, mistrust of authority

18

figures, and difficulties with intimacy.

19

B.

Respondent methodically manipulated this

20

patient and her treatment in order to use her as an object

21

to gratify his own emotional and sexual needs.

22

6.

As a result of the conduct described in paragraph

23

4 above, respondent is alleged to have committed acts of gross

24

negligence, in violation of Code section 2234(b), as more

25

particularly alleged hereinafter:

26

A.

27

Complainant realleges paragraphs 5A and 5B

their entirety at this point.

9.

MA

1 II

7.

As a result of the conduct described in paragraph

2 II 4 above, respondent is alleged to have committed acts of
3 II incompetence, in violation of Code section 2234(d), as more
4

particularly alleged hereinafter:

5

A,

6

Complainant realleges paragraphs 5A and 5B in

their entirety at this point.

7

8.

As a result of the conduct described in paragraph

8

4 above, respondent is alleged to have committed acts of

9

corruption, which are substantially related to the

10

qualifications, functions, or duties of a physician and surgeon,

11

in violation of Code section 2234(e), as more particularly

12

alleged hereinafter:

13
14

A.

Complainant realleges paragraphs 5A and 5B in

their entirety at this point.

15

PRAYER

16

WHEREFORE, complainant requests that the Division hold

17

a hearing on the matters alleged herein, and that following said

18

hearing, the Division issue a decision:

19

1.

Revoking or suspending Physician's and Surgeon's

20

Certificate Number A 48888, heretofore issued to

21

respondent ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D. ;

22

2.

Directing respondent ROBERT WEITZEL, M.D., to pay

23

to the Board a reasonable sum for its

24

investigative and enforcement costs of this actio

25

and, if placed on probation, to pay the probation

26

monitoring costs; and

27 I \ \ \
10.

ATI

1

3.

Taking such other and further action as the Board

2

deems appropriate to protect the public health,

3

safety, and welfare.

4

DATED:

wnvftmhar 4 f 1996

5
6
7

Ron Joseph, Executive Director
Medical Board of California
Department of Consumer Affairs
State of California

8
9

Complainant
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

< OTtfA

25
26
27

MGA:SOl
03573160-SD96AD0444
j:\lee\weitzel.ace
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APPENDIX C - ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSES OF
ROBERT A. WEITZEL
TO PRACTICE MEDICINE AND TO PRESCRIBE
AND ADMINISTER CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

ORDER ON MOTION
TO DISMISS
Case No. DOPL-99-71

APPEARANCES:
Peter Stirba for Respondent
Elizabeth A. Bowman for the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAKT JUDGE:
Respondent filed an August 20, 1999 motion for judgment on
the pleadings, with a supporting memorandum, thus seeking the
dismissal of this case. The Division filed a September 27,
1999 responsive memorandum.

Respondent filed an October 7, 1999

final reply.
Oral argument on the motion was conducted November 8, 1999
before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the
Department of Commerce. The Court took the motion under
advisement at the conclusion of oral argument.
The Court, being fully advised in the premises, now enters
its Conclusions of Law and Order:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent initially contends this adjudicative proceeding
should be dismissed because R156-1-502 (1), the rule whereby the
Division seeks entry of a disciplinary sanction as to
Respondent's licenses in this case, exceeds the scope of the
Division's rulemaking authority as delegated by the Utah
Legislature. Respondent further urges the rule is invalid as
inconsistent with U.C.A. §58-1-501(2), which generally defines
unprofessional conduct.
Respondent also asserts R156-1-502 (1) impermissibly expands
the definition of unprofessional conduct and thus subjects a
licensee to potential disciplinary action for engaging in conduct
that, by itself, is not improper.

Respondent further contends:

(1) R156-1-502 (1) violates substantive and procedural due
process; (2) the rule is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the
rule constitutes an improper exercise of legislative power by an
executive branch agency and is thus violative of the
constitutionally mandated separation of powers applicable to-the
tripartite branches of government.
The Division argues R156-1-502(1) represents a valid
exercise of its rulemaking authority.

The Division urges the

Legislature has expressly delegated broad authority to the
Division to define unprofessional conduct by rule and R156-1502(1) promotes the same purpose served by the statutory

2

definitions of unprofessional conduct set forth in §58-1-502(2).
The Division also asserts R156-1-502 (1) is rationally
designed to protect the public from a licensee who elects to
surrender their license in another jurisdiction with either an
investigation pending or a proceeding in progress which involves
unprofessional or unlawful conduct and who then relocates to Utah
with the hope of avoiding any entry of a disciplinary sanction.
The Division vigorously urges R156-1-502(1) should be sustained
as representing a proper discharge of its mandate to protect the
public under such circumstances.
§63-46b-l(4)(b) provides a presiding officer may grant a
timely motion to dismiss an adjudicative proceeding "if the
requirements of Rule 12 (b) . . • of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are met by the moving party".

R151-46b-7(6)(a) further

provides:
Subsection 63-46b-l(4)(b) shall not be
construed to prohibit a presiding officer
from granting a timely motion to dismiss for
. . . failure to establish a claim upon which
relief may be granted . . . .
The Court assumes - for purposes of this motion - the accuracy of
the facts alleged in the April 29, 1999 Petition, whereby this
adjudicative proceeding was initiated. Brown v. Weis,
552, 561 (Utah App. 1994).

871 P.2d

The Court thus acknowledges

Respondent surrendered his license to practice medicine in
California after that state had initiated proceedings, wherein it
3

was alleged Respondent was incompetent and he had engaged in
grossly negligent conduct, unprofessional conduct and sexual
misconduct.
Prior to addressing the threshold issue presented by
Respondent's motion, the Court initially notes this forum lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to address Respondent's varied
constitutional challenges to R156-1-502(1).

It is well

established that administrative agencies lack the power to
determine the constitutionally of statutes,

Clayton

5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531, 533 (1956); Johnson
Retirement
Robinson,

Office,

v.

v.
Utah

621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980); Davis

871 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah App. 1994),

Bennett,
State
v.

This Court readily

concludes the same jurisdictional limit applies when an agency
rule is subject to constitutional attack.
There is another preliminary matter to be considered.

The

Division urges public policy demands a licensee should be subject
to potential disciplinary action in this state if the licensee
chooses to surrender their license without proving their
innocence in a foreign jurisdiction.

Essentially, the Division

argues its regulatory authority should prevent a licensee from
fleeing to Utah as a safe haven without having fully litigated
allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct in the sister
state.
The Court readily acknowledges R156-1-502(1) appears to
4

reflect sound policy.

That rule certainly allows the Division to

most effectively protect the public.

However, it is not within

the province of this Court to weight policy arguments which might
assess

sustain R156-1-502 (1), analyze the purpose for that rule,

the wisdom of such a provision or generally determine whether the
rule embodies good policy.
Tennessee

Public

Service

Tennessee

Commission,

Cable

Television

Ass'n

v.

844 S.W.2d 151, 168 (Tenn.

App. 1992).
Rather, the fundamental inquiry before the Court is whether
R156-1-502 (1) represents a proper exercise of the Division's
rulemaking authority as delegated by the Legislature.

§58-1-203

provides:
The following duties, functions, and
responsibilities of the division shall be
performed by the division with the
collaboration and assistance of the
appropriate board:
(5) defining unprofessional
conduct, by rule, to supplement
the
definitions under this chapter or
other licensing chapters.
§58-1-501(2) generally provides unprofessional conduct means
conduct by a licensee as defined "under this title or under any
rule adopted under this title".
§58-1-501(2) then sets forth eleven definitions of
unprofessional conduct. Subsection (d) of that statute provides
such conduct includes:
. . . engaging in conduct that results in
5
M. t

disciplinary action, including reprimand,
censure, diversion, probation, suspension, or
revocation, by any other licensing or
regulatory authority having jurisdiction over
the licensee . . . if the conduct would, in
this state, constitute grounds for denial of
licensure or disciplinary proceedings under
Section 58-1-401.
Pursuant to §58-1-203(5), the Division has promulgated R156-1502(1) to define unprofessional conduct as:
(1) surrendering licensure to any other
licensing or regulatory authority having
jurisdiction over the licensee . . . while an
investigation or inquiry into allegations of
unprofessional or unlawful conduct is in
progress or after a charging document has
been filed against the . . . licensee
alleging unprofessional or unlawful conduct.
Utah courts have addressed the general nature and scope of
legislative grants of authority to state agencies. The Utah
Supreme Court captured that issue in somewhat colorful terms in
IML Freight,

Inc.

et

al.

v C.N.

Ottosen,

538 P.2d 296 (Utah

1975), stating:
It is axiomatic that a statutory
administrative agent of the state enjoys or
suffers the favor or forbearance of
legislative fiat, as the circumstances may
enjoin. His beneficence or capability to
obligate, restrict or expand, extends no
farther than the metes and bounds of the
bailiwick in which the lawmakers grant or
limit his sovereignty. Beyond that, he must
risk the happenstance of possible
constitutional, legislative or judicial
circumscription. Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals has generally identified the limit of a

6

state agencyfs exercise of a legislative grant of authority.

The

Court has thus recognized:
The Industrial Commission is not free to
"legislate" in areas apparently overlooked by
our lawmakers or to exercise power not
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
legislature, even in the name of fairness.
Bevans

v.

Industrial

Commission,

790 P.2d 573, 578 (Utah App.

1990).
The issue squarely framed by Respondent's motion is whether
the Division - in promulgating R156-1-502 (1) - exceeded the scope
of its rulemaking authority as conferred by the Legislature.
Such authority has been generally described in these terms:
• . . the power to adopt rules is a
legislative power, delegated within
constitutional restrictions. Rules adopted
pursuant to such lawfully delegated authority
are valid only if they are adopted in
accordance with prescribed procedures,
conform to controlling provisions of organic
and statutory law other than those relating
to the scope and extent of delegated power,
are supported by an adequate factual basis,
are an appropriate exercise of agency
discretion, and are within the scope and
extent of the power delegated
by the
legislature.
Concern here is only with the
last of these
requirements.
24 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 309, 332-33. The two standards frequently
used by courts to assess whether rulemaking authority has been
properly exercised are as follows:
The first is that a rule cannot "enlarge,
modify, or contravene the provisions of the
statute." The second is that the rule must
be "reasonably related to the purposes of the

i n.

enabling legislation." In generally
comparing these two standards, one can
immediately see that while the first relates
to the provisions of the statute, the second
relates to the purposes of the statute. This
alone is a significant distinction. Id.
Whether a state agency has promulgated a rule within the
appropriate bounds of legislatively delegated authority
necessarily requires due consideration of the statutes relevant
to the exercise of that authority. Thus, it has been stated:
Many statutes include a section containing
a statement of purpose or intent. However, a
statute almost never consists solely of such
a statement. Rather, a statute customarily
includes many other provisions that establish
the particular programs and means to be
employed to achieve the expressed or implied
purposes of the statute. Since there are
numerous ways to achieve a given purpose, the
provisions of the statute are invariably more
specific than its purpose.
Because the standard that a rule cannot
"enlarge, modify, or contravene the
provisions of the statute" requires a more
specific relation to the statute, one might
expect that it would be a stricter standard.
In applying this standard, fewer rules should
be found valid. Conversely, the standard
that a rule must be "reasonably related to
the purposes of the enabling legislation"
does not require such a specific relation to
the statute, One might expect that it would
be an easier standard to meet, so that in
applying that standard, more rules would be
found valid. Id. at 333-34.
Significantly, it has also been .recognized that:
The fact that application of one standard
or the other is apparently so predictive of
the outcome might give rise to the suspicion
that they are not really employed as
standards at all, but rather as
8

justifications. Consciously or
unconsciously, the choice of the standard may
not precede evaluation of the rule, but in
fact may be determined after the decision on
whether to uphold the rule is made on other,
less well-defined grounds.
It is also possible that circumstances
other than the decision of whether to uphold
the rule dictate the choice of the standard.
Even though both standards, by their own
terms, attempt to measure a rule against the
scope and extent of the power delegated by
the enabling act, administrative law judges
and the courts may find it impractical or
impossible to apply a particular standard in
some situations. One immediate thought is
that the "enlarge the provisions"
standard
cannot be applied in some instances
precisely
because there are no specific
provisions
that
can be reasonably
identified
as the law being
implemented by the
rule.
Regardless of the reasons dictating the
choice of the standard, if the standard is
determined before a rule is considered
against its requirements, two points are
clear. First, the initial
choice of the
standard is vitally
important.
Second, the
"enlarge the provisions"
standard
is
considerably
more strict
than the "related
to
the purpose" standard.
Id. at 336-37.
The foregoing analysis readily explains the clear dichotomy
between the submissions filed by the parties on the motion now
under review.

The lynchpin of Respondent's argument is that

R156-1-502 (1) exceeds

the proper

scope of the Division's

rulemaking authority to define unprofessional conduct.
Conversely, the essence of the Division's position is that R1511-502(1) promotes

its

primary

charge to protect

the public

in a

manner entirely similar to the various definitions of
unprofessional conduct set forth in §58-1-502(2).
9
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Utah courts have alternatively employed the "related to the
purpose" and the "enlarge the provisions" standards in various
cases to address whether an agency has properly exercised its
rulemaking authority.

When the rule in question has been

sustained as being an appropriate exercise of such authority, the
focus has often been whether the rule was "reasonably necessary",
"consistent with" the duties to be performed by the agency and
Consolidation

whether the rule served "significant purposes".
Coal Company v. Utah Division

of State

Lands and Forestry,

886

P.2d 514, 527 (Utah 1994); Howell v. County Board of Cache
ex rel

IHC Hospitals,

Inc.,

County

881 P.2d 880, 890 (Utah 1994) C\

. .

we conclude that the Tax Commission acted in accordance with its
charge to administer and supervise the state tax laws");
Central

Utah Telephone

Association,

Inc.

v. State

Tax

South

Commission,

951 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1997) CxIn addition to the presumption of
validity that accompanies agency rules, rule 78 is supported by
sound policy . . . .

Rule 78 is an effective method of

accomplishing the purpose of the statute").
Alternatively, when a rule has been invalidated as exceeding
an agency's rulemaking authority, courts have acknowledged the
"long-standing principle of administrative law that an agency's
rules must be consistent with its governing statutes7' and "a rule
that is out of harmony with a governing statute is invalid".
Sanders

Brine Shrimp v. State

Tax Commission,
10

846 P.2d 1304, 1306

(Utah 1993); Eaton Kenway, Inc.

v. State

882, 885 (Utah 1995); Crossroads

Tax Commission,

Plaza Association

P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1996); Mt. Olympus Waters,
Commission,
Department

906 P.2d

v. Pratt,

Inc.

v.

912

Tax

877 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah App. 1994); Fussell

v.

of Commerce, 815 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App. 1991) (the

rule "is out of harmony with its controlling statute").
Utah courts have stated an administrative agency's authority
to promulgate regulations:
. . . is limited to those regulations which
are consonant with the statutory
framework,
and neither
contrary to the statute
nor
beyond its scope . . . . Administrative
regulations inay not conflict
with the
design
of an Act, and when they do the court has a
duty to invalidate
them . . .Furthermore,
when an administrative official misconstrues
a statute and issues a regulation beyond the
scope of the statute, it is in excess of
administrative authority granted . . . .
Crowther

v. Nationwide

Mutual Insurance

1122 (Utah App. 1988); Dustyfs,

Inc.

P.2d 868, 871 (Utah 1992); Miller

Protection,

v.

Company, 762 P.2d 1119,

v. State

Tax Commission,

Division

of

842

Consumer

962 P.2d 810, 812 (Utah App. 1998) ("administrative

regulations may not extend beyond the scope of a statute");
Belnorth

Petroleum

v. State

Tax Commission,

845 P.2d 266, 271

(Utah App. 1993).
Thus, our courts have declared rules "are subordinate to
statutes and cannot confer greater rights or disabilities".
Rocky Mountain

Energy

v. State

Tax Commission,
11

852 P.2d 284, 287

(Utah 1993); IML Freight,

Inc.

et

al.

v.

C.N.

Ottosen,

supra at

297 (". . . the legislature may not delegate authority to a Board
to adopt rules or regulations which abridge, enlarge, extend, or
modify the statute creating the right or imposing the duty");
Ferro

v. Department

of Commerce,

App. 1992); Crowther

v.

Nationwide

828 P.2d, 507, 512 (Utah Ct.
Mutual

Insurance

Company,

supra.
Statutes, and administrative rules should generally be
construed according to their plain language. Archer
State

Lands and Forestry,

v. Board

907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995).

of

Thus,

each term of a statute or an administrative rule should be read
literally "unless such a reading is unreasonably inoperable or
confused".

See Morton

Int'l,

Inc.

v.

State

Tax Commission,

814

P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991).
The Fussell

Court invalidated a rule which engrafted a

requirement beyond that set forth in its statutory counterpart.
Significantly, the Court concluded the rule "goes beyond the
intent of the legislature as reflected in the language of [the
statute]".

Id. at 254. The Court noted the Division's argument

that the rule "is necessary, as a matter of policy, to protect
the public from inadequately prepared practitioners".
The Fussell

Id.

Court further recognized the Legislature had

adopted the policy - represented by the challenged rule - through
a subsequent enactment. Significantly, the Court thus stated
12

that "whatever policy drawbacks may have existed under the former
statute, it was up to the legislature to provide a remedy."
The Fussell

id.

Court concluded the Division - by promulgating the

rule in question - ^improperly encroached upon the legislature's
sole province" and such a "usurpation of legislative function"
invalidated the rule. Id. at 254-55.
§58-1-501(2) (d) is the statutory half-cousin of R156-1502(1).

Both the statute and the rule share a common purpose.

Nevertheless, the critical difference between §58-1-501(2) (d) and
R156-l-502(l) is that the statute applies when disciplinary
action is entered by another licensing or regulatory authority,
whereas the rule is premised on the relinquishment of a license
in the face of allegations which might have otherwise prompted
entry of disciplinary action after contested litigation or
through a stipulation. R156-1-502(1) essentially equates the
surrender of a license - when coupled with outstanding
allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct - with the
entry of disciplinary action on the license.
The Division generally contends the Court should apply
various principles of statutory construction to sustain the
validity of R156-l-502(l). The Division urges that rule should
be construed "to harmonize its provisions" in accordance with the
"intent and purpose" of §58-1-501(2).
Department

of Environmental

Quality,

See V-l Oil

Company v.

904 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah App.

13
ti \n

1994).

The Division also argues this Court should recognize both

the broad discretion granted to the Division by the Legislature
to define unprofessional conduct by rule and that the Division
has exercised its expertise in promulgating R156-1-502 (1).

The

Division thus asserts the Court should accord due deference to
the terras of the rule.
The Court finds and concludes both §58-1-501(2) and R156-1502(1) are unambiguous. Thus, it is not necessary to resort to
principles of statutory construction to ascertain the meaning of
those provisions. The Court duly notes the Division's urgence
that R156-l-502(l) should be interpreted as consistent with its
mandate to protect the public. The Court also acknowledges the
Division's assertion that the Legislature - when enacting §58-1502(2) (d) - may not have been aware of the strategy which could
be utilized by a licensee of a sister state to surrender their
license in that jurisdiction in the face of pending disciplinary
sanction and then flee to Utah to continue an uninterrupted
practice of their profession.
R156-l-502(l) is entitled to a presumption of validity.
South Central
Commission,

Utah Telephone

Association,

Inc.

v. State

Tax

supra. However, whether that rule exceeds the scope

of the Division's rulemaking authority is a question of law. The
proper analysis under §63-46b-16(4) (d) as to whether a state
agency "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law" was

14

described in Bevans v. Industrial

Commission,

supra:

Before the adoption of UAPA (Utah
Administrative Procedures Act), issues
involving the interpretation of the statutory
boundaries of an agency's power and authority
were treated by Utah courts as questions of
law, which are reviewed under a correctionof-error standard with no deference to the
agency's determinations. This absence of
deference is appropriate because a

determination of what authority
has been
statutorily
conferred on an
administrative
agency by the Legislature
is not
"illuminated
by [the] agency's expertise"'.
(Citations
omitted). Id. at 575-76.
The Bevans

Court concluded the same standard continues to apply

when reviewing such an issue under the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act.

Id. at 576.

The Court finds and concludes it is a misnomer to
characterize the Division's promulgation of R156-1-502(1) as
based on an exercise of agency expertise to thus

warrant

deferential treatment of that rule. Rather, the Division has
simply concluded §58-1-501(2) is not broad enough to address the
consequences which should attend the surrender of a license xn
another jurisdiction amid allegations of unprofessional or
unlawful conduct in that forum.
The Division's interpretation of the scope of its rulemaking
authority - and this Court's determination of that issue - should
only be upheld if "it is not erroneous". Bevans
Commission,

supra.

v.

Industrial

The appellate courts of this state are the
15

arbiters most qualified to ultimately resolve the issue now under
review. Bevans

v. Industrial

Commission,

supra.

The Court acknowledges the "subject of professional
performance is too comprehensive to be codified in detail".
Vance v.

Fordham,

671 P.2d 124, 129 (Utah 1983).

By its terms,

§58-1-502 is not meant to be all-inclusive. Accordingly, it is
clear that unprofessional conduct can be defined by both statute
and rule.
The Court thus reiterates §58-1-203(5) authorizes the
Division to promulgate rules to "supplement" statutory
definitions of unprofessional conduct.

That term has a common

meaning as "something that completes or makes an addition."
Webster's

Ninth

New Collegiate

Dictionary

(1985).

However, the Court finds and concludes R156-1-502 (1) does
far more than merely supplement §58-1-502 (d).

The rule

substantially expands and operatively amends the scope of its
statutory relative. Moreover, the Court also finds and concludes
R156-l-502(l) is fundamentally distinct from the framework o£
unprofessional conduct generally established by §58-1-502(2).
§§58-1-502(2)(a)-(k) allows the entry of a disciplinary
sanction based on some underlying misconduct or adverse condition
of the licensee.

However, the surrender of a license in the face

of allegations of unprofessional conduct does not necessarily
establish those allegations. An individual who holds licenses in
16

multiple jurisdictions could understandably elect to forego
contesting allegations of unprofessional conduct in any given
state for various reasons, not all of which are directly
probative of whether the licensee actually engaged in conduct
violative of any statutes or rules which thus govern their
profession.
The Division contends courts in other states have recognized
the authority of a licensing agency to protect the public by
disciplining a licensee who surrenders their license when there
has been no admission of unprofessional conduct in the foreign
jurisdiction. The Division thus relies on Butts
Board

of Architects,

v. Wyoming

911 P.2d 1062 (Wyo 1996); In re

State

Tatreauf

1996 WL 601653 (an unpublished 1996 opinion of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals); Marek v. Board
App.4th 1089 (1993); Clare

of

v. State

Podiatric
Board

Cal.App.4th 294 (1992); and Sternberg
Board

for
Butts

Professional

Medical

Conduct,

v.

Medicine,

of Accountancy,
Administrative

16 Cal.
10
Review

652 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1997).

involved an architect subject to disciplinary action

in Wyoming after his Kentucky license had been

suspended

to a settlement agreement. The physician in Tatreau

pursuant

faced

disciplinary action in Minnesota after he surrendered his
Colorado license with a provision that any subsequent renewal or
reinstatement of that license would be restricted and limited.
Most significantly, Minnesota law expressly provided that the
17

M It

"restriction" or "limitation" of a license constituted grounds
for disciplinary action. Id, at 2,
Marek involved two physicians who were subject to
disciplinary action in California after their Nevada licenses had
been

revoked

decree.

and then placed

on probation

The accountant in Clare

faced

pursuant to a consent

disciplinary action in

California after his ability to practice before another
governmental agency (the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) had
suspended.

Sternberg

been

involved a physician subject to

disciplinary action in New York after he surrendered his Florida
license who acknowledged - to avoid

a license

of probation

which had been

complaint

and a substantial
subject

to appeal

deemed to be in the nature
license".

fine

suspension,
entered

a term
on a

- that the Florida surrender "was
of a disciplinary

action

against

his

Id. (All emphasis herein added.)

The Division also relies on Cooper v. Department
and Human Services,

of

Health

1996 WL 571398 (an unpublished 1996 opinion

of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania).

Pursuant to a consent decree, the physician in

Cooper surrendered his Pennsylvania license in exchange for a
dismissal of all pending disciplinary charges.

Significantly,

the physician then faced exclusion from participation in various
federal health care programs based on a statute

which expressly

authorized such disciplinary action under those circumstances.
18

The foregoing cases are all distinguishable - either
factually or with particular regard for the controlling law in
those cases - from this proceedingSternberg

The Buttsr

Marek,

Clare

and

cases each involved the entry of disciplinary action in

the sister state prior to subsequent licensure proceedings in
Tratreau

another state. There was a governing state statute in

which expressly authorized a subsequent licensure proceeding in
the second state based on the nature of the action initially
entered in the first state. The governing federal statute in
Cooper likewise expressly authorized a subsequent proceeding
after the initial surrender of the license elsewhere.

None of

the foregoing cases present the same critical facts and governing
law which is germane to this proceeding.
The Court reiterates sound public policy arguments may exist
to warrant a subsequent amendment to §58-1-502 (2) (d) . However,
the ultimate "prerogative and responsibility to address such
arguments and "set policy" to most effectively promote the
preeminent purpose behind regulation of professions charged with
the public interest resides in the Legislature.
Nationwide

Mutual

Insurance

Company,

Crowther

v.

supra.

Notwithstanding the Division's salutary intent to discharge
its mandate to protect the public, the Division exceeded the
scope of its rulemaking authority when it promulgated R156-1502(1).

Furthermore, R156-1-502 (1) is not consistent with the
19

fi t/)

statutory framework of §58-1-502(2).

Based on the foregoing, the

Court thus concludes R156-1-502(1) is invalid.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's August 20, 1999 motion
to dismiss this adjudicative proceeding is granted with
prejudice.

Specifically, R156-1-502(1) exceeds the scope of the

Division's rulemaking authority as delegated by the Legislature.
The rule is also inconsistent with the statutory framework
reflected in §58-1-502(2).

R156-1-502 (1) thus provides no proper

basis to enter a disciplinary sanction in this case as to
Respondent's licenses to practice medicine and to prescribe and
administer controlled substances in this state.

Agency review of this Order may be obtained by filing a
request for agency review with the Executive Director, Department
of Commerce, within thirty (30) days after the date of this
—
Order. The laws and rules governing agency review are found in
§63-46b-12 of the Utah Code and §R151-4 6b-12 of the Utah
Administrative Code.
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APPENDIX D - ORDER ON REVIEW, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OFI-4W

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCi
< >i THE STATE OF UTAH

!.»! I Hit MA J J'liKUl' riJhRJ-OliI'M
,

ORDER ON REVIEW

I'AGl-NCYRFVIIW;:!'

ROBERI A.WEITZEL,M.D.

DOPL Case No. w /'[

ORDER
Hie Findings of J'act, Conclusions ol 1 ,<i*v ciikl Ucxommended Order in. this matter are
ratified and adopted by the Executive Director of the Department of *' "oniiiicn'i11 '.wil i

,

therefore
O.RDERED that the Order on Motion to Dismiss heretofore entered dismissing this
aUR*. -•

yi t> -uce should In „ ,mJ v\ liru'by, hrversed and this matter is remanded to the

Division of Occupational and Prolessioiial Licensing ioi lu!ilhH prourdings on the merits.
SO ORDERED this the /jG ^ d a y of .May, 2000.

DOUGLAS CfBORBA, ExeoftiveyDirector
Utah Depanment of Commerce

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERU
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONS
PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
PETITIONER

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW a 1
RECOMMENDED ORDER

)

DOPLcaseNo. 9y-7f

INTRODUCTION
This matter came on \ ^ :*. ^..

'

t

the Division of Occupational and Professional Licen:-. f
the (iisnir l .ii i'i itli [Hi"
M

v -\ * * \ tew filed by 01 or behalf ^f
_

• *s adjudicative action against Robert A vveii/; i

Weitzer)wiihu(iit«I

... .

STATl (i k\ (Mt

PTTT.FS

^

?o appc i
r.ereaii

_^t

PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW

Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted ptjisuaiii w" Sivlmn 6^-46b-12,
i. iH i i" ...i.uaifM

IKI IMeR151-46b-12ofthe Utah Administrative Co H

ISSUES REVIEWED
1,
>" UTAH

Whether the definition oi "i up ii'rsurmal nmdiia" rmitained in the Division's
ADMIN,

RISC)-1-502(1) exceeds the scop*" >i <•> i-

wiili Hit ;Jahji«i ) ti.it*'. i« .i

HI-IRIJIJ; . ' I U K M H U J.I i

i UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-501(2); and
1

• nconsistent

2

Whether the Division's Petition states a cause ol ailici

of "unprofessional romli

lamcil in UTAH CODE ANN.

•<.''• |'1* definition

§58-1-501(2) regardless of the

validity of UTAH ADMIN. R156-1-5021 (I

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

(hi or ^bout April 29, 1 099,

the Division Itli il.;» Petition against WeitzH lor

• 4» • r * nc fiPnp vas that Weitzel had surrendered his license to

unprofessional com hi.

practice medicine in the State of California upoi
14,

sli| julaird agreement entered into on February

1007 rXiipiiIation"1 -^cepted and adopted by the Medical Board i»l i uliioniM i"HiMhl"l .'r;

its decision i>.
2

i

7.

: .stipulation incotporated

rained in an

Accusal/i 'ii filfi' 'iRainst Weitzel by 'the Board on or aooui Novemix..
alleged that Weitzel was siilifcr i u i disciplinary action as a result of having committed sexual.
misconduct and sexually exploited a patient and MMIJ'IH lu luv WrifzcPs license revoked or
fpuspcnded.
3.

"J fie lem^ *i( Hi itipulauon \wx\vx which Weitzel was allowed to settle the

(California case provided that Weitzel gave up his nj'Jn in. ilrnv ilr,n t .wise for discipline existed,
,uul he ivnecd to surrender his license with the midei"j*in«lifig that he would ni> 1«M„/*i™"™ i-«
permitted to prtieii-n' mwinrnt; u I'^lif-iniiii, The stipulation further provided that if Weilzeljsver
sought relicensure in California lie would have In i nini'Iv villi nil the laws, regulations and
i;«j«•«! • i f ! es for reinstatement of a revoked -license... and all oi the charges and allegations
contained in |ih*i Ac truuaium

. v ill be deemed to be true, correct and admitted by [Weitzel]."

()n or about June 7, I ' W. V 'eil.'H i /uisnl n M:S|NHIM in be filed to the Division's
Petitir

nerally denying the allegations contained in the Division1"^ I'etiUoi ^fiUt

•'' "

(.- he sinit'n4\,v

f|

''M'-eptioii

I Ins f ^(ifornia license. Weitzel further filed a number of Affirmative

Defenses, including a challenge that the Division • mk I-1 wuyp, iiMi-i-.)fessional conduct was
2

* nf t*^ r^'whnm hi enact and enforce.
5.

i W9, Weitzel filed a Motion for Judgment on the

leadings in which he argued, inter alia, that the Division •> nit defining, "improti-iisiunal
is beyond the authority of the Division, The motion came before the Adnniuujali vi
»-• 'uui!'
1

'ALJ""") iu>'lMMMFi[» i « Miiv-pphcr 8, 19^0, mul an order was entered on November

* 1999 dismissing the Division's adjudicative proceeding vviiii pivimhuv Specifically, the ALJ
efinition of unprofessional conduct set forth in the Division's rule exceeded the

*. n

<M' ..

nt\; i dlciiiaiiiij.' aiitnon; v .IIIJ is inconsistent with the statutory framework

reflected by the statute defining unprofessional conduct

< ON<1 HSIONSOFLAW
1.

I V Division and Weitzel agree in theii i" * N "i this appeal presents only a

legal question and therefore lulls undci ihr '"rnun in ,.", viiifi'Lini of review, 1 li-.r issue of
whether the Division's rule exceeded its rulemaking authority, and ihr. in (lindanes < >l" the statute it
iv. is Jillciiii-iiiti" i-1 de fine, presents only a legal issue upon which the ALJ is entitle'*
ill ifrence [Slate vr J'enu, 8r

%

-

>

. 94)] since this case was decided below in a

summary disposition which did not resolve tactual d:>puu- [Si'hmf,

fMfli ni N 4m Inc. 814

P M li'lK (Hiiih l ^ l n
2.

In the i.aso ui h M, ihr I h vi •*•*

ur r alleged thai WriTzel's California

licensing matter fell within the definition of "unproie .>,-.

>th by the

gt«< ". 11 I < 'iisirip, statute .as well as by rule adopted by the Division. The Divisior r- reuuon was
supported by the documenUlm> >n( tht f California proceeding, including the stipulation entered
into by Weitzel to resolve the charges calling 1

3.

;Th surrender of

Following a nt >ii i% i in Vv'cil^jel's motion ( > dismiss the Division's action, the

learned ALJ below entered an order dismissing the Division's pro

i lie

•:atterof la1*-t^.-M T'^iTlu'- ih*
appeal, ^v.,^;>,.

IUIC

pi a 'h% statute couh.«,

•itfav^-iM* •-

u nonmoving party a^: t ii i

J where it appears that there is no genuine dispuiv
iKep

^f far -:*»'* —•*

entitled to judgment as a mattei o? -i **.

)2 (l-uti

4.

Swen.^*t i i- * * - *.

• <j ).

The ALJV- consideration of WeitzcJ's molion

'.<.-.'!.-(

/.

IUKI

n 41. 1 1 in ii all • .1 m (acts and

- • r nst favorable to the loser - the Division - be accepted as pi oven m

considering :

,

>ouchet Ross & (lo.9 926 J".AI bJ'i «I »UI« I'W-

Uiis forum. Don 5.

iiMtun . II .', ih.it siandjid which must also be applied on appeal in

I'he ili.smrssnl of the Division's action below would necessarily have requueu the

ALJ to find il

in i !aliloimd acln'C «("iJp«iliiij; flu* admissions of Weitzel contained therein, did
\n's allegations within the statutoi) iramcwiMl. ni ilit; ildhnt'^r n f

not brinj
f,

unpi -. sshiirii 1 ,i i.Miiif ff 10 reach such a conclusion, Although to reach his conclusions 01 law

required acceptance by the Ai .1 01 iltc Lit Is niosl frifinable to the Divisions position, such fact
^m bv the ALJ is entitled no deference whatsocvei since an (ails, wi.a ..'idnmifabk1 tor the
||1 w

* •. i • •

afzel f s motion
< I" Ihvnnnis Pennon again1,! WViizel's Utah license relied upon incorporation of

n

the action ol a sisler state against his medical hn*usc I lie alkgaliuiu 1 > in*' Si
a^i

'ifornia

\htitirt wriT contained in the charging document Jiicd by the Medical ;>o-cj..

California on July 28, 1(^,„"" 1 ill."

, ii'uiiioh assrilrJ thai Weitzel had committed acts of sexual

misconduct and sexual exploitation ol a patient, as well as ach • >l gu«»s negligence, arts of
i

and acts of corruption.
7.

The LaiiloiTJiii (litHTcvInti* again'J Weitzel was resolved through an agreement

whereby Weitzel relinquished his license to practice medicine m Hid
- Weitzel's agreement also gave up any right to challenge 1. **.
him, and specified that

,

him would "be deemed to be true, correct

•ami .'mil iiitit il iii iriv fnfnre consideration of his fitness to hold a meaiv<:. — :
ilial his licence would I* iir-ilcd .i'i wun

»

Kcd

: okedlicense if reinstaiement was evei

by him.
8.

T h|s response to the allegations in the Division's Petition, Weilzel aiiiiultci! \\u

surrendei ot Im Laliioniia h u ii>c while denying that the surrender was based upon any alleged
misconduct, including unprofessional condua

* \ ision's claim that

MII rrndeMiii' ;i license in California would constitute unprofessional tonuu»; «;
"I lie stipulation enlci w! ,vv W

"i

:;

• ' in California, although styled a surrender is,

under the facts and reasonable inferences most i .>,..;- only

i

_ is .

-• uif <- nam ;

ill practical purposes the stipulation served the office of a confession ot judgment,

with the sui render to bt ucuied

ai lca?;i in < 'iilifornia - as nothing less than a de facto revocalu 11

of licensure.
10.

R egardless of whether the challenged rule in this case is ultra vires9 in conduct] J ^,

a review of the ordei ironi iri-iuv fjiaiiliiig Waiy«T\ iinnimn and dismissing the Division's
proceeding with prejudice, it is'necessary t<..« i .'pi tin: Calilonua

J»IIM

reelings and allegations

t • • * i« I""" ii wrii incorporated into the Division's action as factually true. While Weilzel inij I• •
have a valid dclense al a hearing HA ih< inenis, on tin1, appeal only the facts and inferences most
favorable to the Division are allowed in considering the appn ipi latentss «>< i dismissal with
( " ! , | l " l ( J l i l".

II
I)j vi -i

aw*

.;

*

* - • - -".^ *TS divisions, including the

.ire ultimate 1) guided by the legislative finding;, -

. .

The Legislature iinas that many businesses and occupations
in the state have a pronounced physical and economic impact in
the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of the state. The
Legislature further finds that while the overall impact is generally
beneficial to the public, the potential for harm and injury
frequently warrants intervention by state government.

5

i AH CODE

1 lie11 .('j-rXtltiirc declares that it is appropriate and necessary for
state government to protect its citizens from harmful and injurious
HI h by persons offering or providing essential or necessary goods
and services to the general public. The Legislature further declares
that business regulation should not be unfairly discriminatory
However, the general public interest must be recognized and
regarded as the primary purpose of all regulation by state
government (Emphasis added).
- \* ir that the Division has a legislative mandate to proitx I iiir (iiililn wcILm:
i , »„....
unprofessioiM

-?^ciplinar\ action against licensees ioi
. » auci. Mich ^ w.i > i^u.axj. ayj.

• * * in (lie case below. UTAH CODE

' 5&-M0K/> ^nerifies that:
iiie division may refuse to issue a license to an applicant
ana may refuse to renew or may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on
probation, issue a public or private reprimand to, or otherwise act
upon the license of any licensee in any of the following cases:
(a) the applicant or licensee has engaged in unprofessional
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under this title;
13.
Division, in the
ami vliclii' P

ative proceeding exceed*-* the .». O\K „. jr, .

diking authority

.-1 .!•" * with the statute defining "unpnSessional conduct

* • * * < ODEAINN. §38 ; .
certa-n

h! w> p1 is whether the rule invoked by the

The first issue to k i i HSHICR1

• ..

i ly means of

authorized the Division K-exercise

p 0 w e r s > including:
• j | i e following duties, functions, and responsibilities of *h<*
division shall be performed by the division with 'the collahorai •
and assistance of the appropriate board
(5) defining unprofessional conduct, by rule, to supplement the
definitions under this chapter or other licensing chapters;
14

Ihemlt1 WI»„J, imi/jd ,,;,)', .:h;iij;nt aitli, violating is UTAH ADMIN. R156-1-502

providing, among other things:
i 11 (professional conduct" includes:

6

(1) surrendering licensure to any other licensing or regulatory
authority having jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the
same occupation or profession while an investigation or inquiry
into allegations of unprofessional or unlawful conduct is in
progress or after a charging document has been filed against the
applicant or licensee alleging unprofessional or unlawful conduct;
I

1 he gene nil licensing statute defining "unprofessional conduct",

UTAH CODE

- i:~r brought against Weitzel,

ANN. §58-1-501(2), also invoked by
states in part:

"Unprofessional conduct" means conduct, by a licensee or
applicant, that is defined as unprofessional conduct under this title
or under any rule adopted under this title and includes:
(d) engaging in conduct that results, in disciplinary action,
including reprimand, censure, diversion, probation, suspension, or
revocation, by any other licensing or regulatory authority having
jurisdiction over the licensee or applicant in the same occupation
or profession if the conduct would, in this state, constitute grounds
for denial of licensure or disciplinary proceedings under Section
58-1-401;
(k) verbally, physically, mentally, or sexir
exploiting any person through conduct connected wu*
licensee's practice under this title or otherwise facilitate ^ «ie
licensee's license;
Tt is necessary4
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entered

this roundabout side-by-side, but emerged in exactly opposite directions as to meaning and
import of the statute and rule.
In construing these subsections, we apply long-standing
rules of statutory construction. "This court's primary objective in
construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent.
The plain language of a statute is generally the best indication of
that intent. Therefore, "where the statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain meaning
to divine legislative intent." The plain language of a statute is to be
read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted in harmony with
other provisions in the same statute and "with other statutes under
the same and related chapters." Furthermore, where possible "we .
. . construe statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their
terms. Most pertinent here is the rule that a statute dealing
specifically with a particular issue prevails over a more general
statute that arguably also deals with the same issue, (citations
omitted). Lyon v. Burton, 387 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 2000).
18.

A consideration of the mandate given to the Department of Commerce and the

Division clearly shows the legislative intent that the primary function of the department and its
divisions be the protection to the citizens of the State of Utah. However, it is not necessary for
this tribunal to mine the intentions of the legislature regarding the statute and rule in question
since the plain language of the statute would include the action brought by the Division, and the
rule clearly fits within the framework of the statute which spawned it.
19.

A fair reading of plain language of UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-501(2) reflects that it

is not intended to be all inclusive, and does not purport to exclude unprofessional conduct which
might fall within its broad guidelines although not specifically pointed out by illustration or
example. The inclusory intent of the statutory definition to cover more than the enumerations of
subsection (2)(a-k) is shown by the preamble to subsection (2): '"Unprofessional conduct' means
conduct... that is defined as unprofessional conduct under this title or under any rule adopted
under this title and includes:"
20.

The general licensing act referenced in the immediately preceding paragraph then
8

proceeds to list certain areas of conduct which the legislature considers to generally and
generically constitute unprofessional conduct, sufficiently broad to be applicable across the over
130,000 licensees in 185 diverse classifications of occupations and professions currently being
regulated by the Division under the authority granted by the legislature under the general
licensing act and the profession specific licensing acts.
21.

Subsection (d) under the definition of "unprofessional conduct" in the general

licensing act addresses the issue presented in the case at bar. A fair reading, exclusive of the
items set off between commas, reads: "engaging in conduct that results in disciplinary action...
by any other licensing or regulatory authority having jurisdiction... if the conduct would, in this
state, constitute grounds for denial of licensure or disciplinary proceedings..."
22.

In between the commas in subsection (d) the legislature inserted examples of

various forms of disciplinary action "... including reprimand, censure, diversion, probation,
suspension, or revocation..." The use of the word "including" - for the second time in pertinent
sections of subsection (2) defining "unprofessional conduct" - indicates that the examples of
disciplinary action are not exclusive but merely illustrate the range of discipline available. The
listing by the legislature appears to be an ascending scale of punitive results, starting with a
reprimand and ending with revocation.
23.

The surrender of a license for sexual misconduct and sexual exploitation of a

patient, under the terms and conditions of the California stipulation which contains the
undisputed facts in this matter for the purpose of entertaining a motion to dismiss, would appear
to fit nicely within the list of deadly sins, perfiaps between probation and suspension on the high
end of the Utah disciplinary scale.
24.

Whether or not the allegations admitted to by Weitzel in his California stipulation

would constitute actionable conduct subjecting him to discipline in Utah is addressed by the
legislature in §58-l-501(2)(k), which determines that "unprofessional conduct" includes: "...
sexually abusing or exploiting any person through conduct connected with the licensee's practice"
9

CA

under this title

" The licensing statute directly addresses the exact conduct which resulted in

Weitzel losing his California license and which was undisputed for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss.
25.

An apparent determination by the ALJ that the conduct engaged in by Weitzel in

California did not rise to the level of activity which would be punishable in Utah was an
unwarrantedfindingunder a motion proceeding requiring that the facts be construed most
favorably for the Division. The issue of the nature and degree of Weitzel's California conduct is
one to be addressed at a hearing, and one which must be based upon evidence and testimony
adduced at a hearing.
26.

The required elements of proof established by §58-1 -501 (2)(d) and the allegations

of the Division's Petition are:
a. Statute: engaging in conduct resulting in disciplinary action - Petition: Weitzel
was charged with serious unprofessional conduct by the California authorities.
b. Statute: by a licensing authority having jurisdiction - Petition: Weitzel was
licensed by California at the time that state sought to suspend or revoke his license to practice.
c. Statute: if the conduct would warrant disciplinary action in Utah - Petition:
surrender of his license under the conditions set out in the California action and stipulation would
clearly fall within the statute. The activity charged by California would also constitute
unprofessional conduct in Utah under subsection (k) of §58-1-501(2).
27.

Weitzel's surrender of his license for acts of unprofessional conduct in a sister

state would place him four-square within the statutory definition of "unprofessional conduct" in
the State of Utah. The next issue to be determined on this appeal is whether the definition
contained in the rule, under which the Division charges that Weitzel's conduct also falls,
constitutes impermissible and therefore unenforceable rulemaking by the Division.
28.

The challenged rule, UTAH ADMIN. Rl 56-1 -502(1), provides that the definition of

"unprofessional conduct" incorporates "surrendering, licensure... after a charging document has
10

been filed against t h e . . . licensee alleging unprofessional.. conduct

" The undisputed facts

in this case clearly place Weitzel in the grasp of this rule, if it is enforceable.
29.

The Division is authorized by UTAH CODE ANN. §58-1-203(5) to adopt rules to

supplement the definitions of unprofessional conduct, regardless of whether the definitions are
contained in the general licensing statutes or the profession specific licensing statutes. In his
opinion the learned ALJ defined "supplement", as used in the licensing act at §58-1-203(5), as a
noun (Order, p. 16). However, in the statute authorizing rules, the phrase of "to supplement the
definitions" it is used as a verb, with the meaning of "to add to; to make more complete by an
additional part." Webster's New Concise Dictionary (1984 ed.).
30.

It is not suggested that the legislature has given the Division free rein to rewrite

the laws given it to enforce. However, within the framework of the regulatory statutes, the
Division has been authorized to utilize its expertise and that of its boards, made up of
professionals in the various regulated fields, to define "unprofessional conduct". In reviewing
the definition at issue in this case, it is not possible to uphold a finding that such an addition was
not contemplated by the legislature.
31.

The case at bar presents more than a simple surrender of a license. Weitzel did

not merely walk awayfromhis California license without pressure and of his own accord and
volition. Instead, with representation of counsel, Weitzel cut a deal stripping him of hisrightto
practice medicine in that state to close the disciplinary action pending. As part of the bargain
Weitzel agreed that should he attempt to obtain another medical license in California, such an
action would be considered the same as seeking a reinstatement after license revocation with all
of the charges made against him in the California action taken as admitted by Weitzel.
32.

Under the facts required to be accepted as true in this matter, Weitzel engaged in

conduct in California which, if committed in Utah, could have opened him up to severe
disciplinary action. The licensing act reasonably seeks to put Utah in the position of sister states
when considering the import of conduct committed in the foreign jurisdiction upon a Utah
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license. The proscribed nature of the admitted conduct is the same in either state, and the range
of punishment appears to be the same in either state.
33.

The State of Utah has at least as much right to protect its citizens as does the State

of California, and Utah is reasonably entitled to place itself in the same position as California
when dealing with exported problem practitioners from that state. The California surrender of
licensure was not a passive act by Weitzel, but possessed all of the trappings and accouterments
of a plea bargain whereby he achieved the best results under the circumstances. The Division
should not and, under its legislative delegation, cannot allow itself to become a safe harbor for
miscreants from other jurisdictions choosing flight over fight.
34.

These conclusions of law are based upon the required conclusory acceptance of

only the facts most favorable to the Division, and should not be construed as indicating that
Weitzel is denied any right to present mitigating evidence and affirmative matters to offset the
presumption created by the California surrender under charges. These conclusions should also
not be taken as indicating any opinion as to whether the State of Utah must or should follow the
example of the State of California in determining that WeitzeFs conduct warranted the loss of his
license to practice medicine.

RECOMMENDED ORDER
ORDERED that the Order on Motion to Dismiss heretofore entered dismissing this
action with prejudice should be, and is hereby, reversed and this matter is remanded to the
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for further proceedings on the merits.
Dated this the / % 2 g day of May, 2000.

MICHAEL R. MEDLEY, Department Counse
Utah Department of Commerce
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APPENDIX E - PETITION FOR REVIEW
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PETER STIRBA (Bar No. 3118)
JOHN WARREN MAY (Bar No. 7412)
DARIEN ALCORN (Bar No. 8712)
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street, Suite 1150
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
ROBERT A. WEITZEL, M.D.
Petitioner,
vs.

:
:

PETITION FOR REVIEW

:

Subject To Assignment To The.
Court Of Appeals

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

DOPLCaseNo. 99-71

Respondent,

Notice is hereby given that Robert A. Weitzel, petitioner, petitions the Utah Supreme
Court, subject to assignment to the Court of Appeals, to review the Order of the respondent made
in this matter on the 16th day of May, 2000, and attached hereto.
This petition seeks review of the entire Order.
Petitioner requests the court to direct the respondent to prepare and certify to the court its
entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and evidence taken in this matter.

Dated this / O day of June, 2000.
STIRBA & HATHAWAY

ByCZ^
PETER STII
JOHN WARREN MAY
DARIEN ALCORN
Attorneys for Petitioner

